As litigation claims against portfolio companies have increased, so have accompanying claims asserted directly against funds (and their sponsors). Plaintiffs’ reasoning for including funds as defendants is no mystery: funds often have greater financial resources than the defendant portfolio company, particularly where the portfolio company is in distress, and thus represent the proverbial “deep pockets.” This is especially true where a liquidity event involving the portfolio company either recently occurred or is on the horizon. Liquidity events, which range from major portfolio company transactions to liquidation or reorganization, often lead to substantial returns for funds.

Another source of litigation risk for fund sponsors are claims brought by portfolio company employees.  Sponsors should be aware of these risks, particularly when the portfolio company is in distress or is considering a sale or other transaction affecting the disposition of shares in the company.  We have set forth below just a few examples of litigation that can be brought against the fund, sponsor, and board designees by portfolio company employees, likely triggering at least indemnity considerations (which need to be evaluated in connection with insurance and indemnity at the portfolio company level), and might also affect the value of the portfolio company and in turn the value of the fund’s assets.

Private funds frequently negotiate for special rights when making an investment in a portfolio company, such as the right to appoint one or more board directors, voting rights, and liquidation preferences. Fund sponsors often focus solely on the positive aspects of these special rights, such as increased control, without considering fully other implications. As the Peter Parker principle reminds us, with great power comes great responsibility. In the fund context, sponsors should remember the portfolio company corollary: with greater control comes greater exposure to liability.

Over the last few years, we have seen an uptick in litigation claims against sponsors and funds arising out of their interests in portfolio companies.  A fund sponsor’s participation on a portfolio company board, in particular, is a risk factor for the entire investment structure (the GP, the Management Company, individual members of the GP and Management Company, and the Fund) due to conflicts of interest, whether real or perceived, and related competing fiduciary duties.  There are, however, steps that fund sponsors can take to manage and reduce their risks.  The first step is to develop a full understanding of where, and why, risks lie in the investment structure.  With that understanding, sponsors can develop and implement practices to manage and reduce those risks.

We at The Capital Commitment blog have previously discussed several steps for fund managers and others to weather the storm brought by COVID-19.  One of those steps is assessing the likelihood of a carried interest return obligation under a fund agreement’s general partner clawback provision (and planning for how to mitigate those obligations, if necessary).  A recent article from our colleagues in Proskauer’s Private Funds group highlights the important role that general partner clawbacks play in ensuring the economic deal between a fund manager and the fund’s limited partners is protected, regardless of how market disruptions, such as those brought on by COVID-19, impact a fund’s portfolio.

The impact of the global coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak has been rapidly evolving, causing disruption in global commerce across a wide range of industries. Private fund managers are not immune to the disruption. According to PitchBook’s latest analysis, private equity and venture ­­capital still have record amounts of dry powder ($2.4 trillion) to weather the storm and step in to provide liquidity to businesses. However, operations, fundraising, deal sourcing, and performance will likely be negatively affected, at least in the near-term, by the economic deterioration caused by COVID-19.